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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
* Honorable Marilyn Horan, United States District 






HORAN, District Judge. 
 
 Abner Antonio Arcos Sanchez petitions for review of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) decision 
dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial 
of his application for asylum, withholding of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and withholding of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The Board also denied 
Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand to the IJ for administrative 
closure, which would have given time for renewal of his 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status.  On 
this latter issue, the Board cited then Attorney General 
Sessions’ decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
271 (A.G. 2018).  The Board determined that the IJ and the 
Board did not have authority to administratively close 
proceedings, unless a “regulation or a previous judicially 
approved settlement expressly authorizes such an action” as set 
forth in Castro-Tum.  A.R. 4.  As such, remand for 
consideration of administrative closure, while Arcos Sanchez 
pursued DACA status renewal, was denied.  For the reasons 
we discuss below, we grant Arcos Sanchez’s petition for 
review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
 In 2002, at the age of seven, Arcos Sanchez, a native 
and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without 
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inspection.  In 2012, he applied for DACA1 status, which was 
approved.  The Department of Homeland Security periodically 
granted his requests for renewals.  On April 8, 2019, Arcos 
Sanchez was arrested and charged in New Jersey with sexual 
assault and endangering the welfare of a child.  On May 17, 
2019, based upon that arrest and those charges, the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 
revoked Arcos Sanchez’s DACA status.  In June 2019, the 
 
 1 Since June 15, 2012, DACA has granted certain 
immigrant children and young adults deferred action, a form of 
prosecutorial discretion where the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) formally decides not to pursue removal of 
otherwise deportable non-citizens.  See DHS, Memorandum 
from Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Janet Napolitano, “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children, (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-
children.pdf, Addendum A (“Napolitano Memorandum”).  To 
be considered for DACA, applicants must satisfy the 
requirements set forth in the Napolitano Memorandum.  
Specifically, the applicant must: 1. Have entered the United 
States under the age of 16; 2. Have continuously resided in the 
United States since June 15, 2007; 3. Be currently enrolled in 
school, have graduated from high school, have obtained a 
general education development certificate, or have been 
honorably discharged from the U.S. Coast Guard or Armed 
Forces; 4. Have not been convicted of a felony offense, a 
significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor 
offenses, or are otherwise not a threat to national security or 
public safety; and 5. Have been under the age of 30 as of 
June 5, 2012.  Napolitano Memorandum at 1. 
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Department of Homeland Security took Arcos Sanchez into 
custody, served him with a Notice to Appear, and charged him 
as being present without having been admitted or paroled.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii). 
 
 In removal proceedings before the IJ, Arcos Sanchez 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and for relief 
under CAT.  The IJ denied asylum, finding that  Arcos Sanchez 
failed to meet the one-year filing deadline or show 
extraordinary circumstances in the delay.  The IJ denied 
withholding of removal, finding the proposed social group was 
not cognizable.  Finally, the IJ denied his CAT claim, finding 
he did not demonstrate at least a fifty percent chance he would 
be tortured upon his return to Mexico.  On November 6, 2019, 
the IJ issued his decision and ordered Arcos Sanchez’s removal 
to Mexico.  Two weeks later, his state criminal charges were 
dismissed.   
 
 On appeal to the Board, Arcos Sanchez challenged the 
IJ’s decision and requested the Board remand his case to the IJ 
for consideration of administrative closure.  He argued that, 
because the state criminal charges were dismissed, he was 
“eligible for renewal of his DACA and re-filed with UCIS on 
January 28, 2020[,]” which would impact the disposition of his 
removal proceeding.  A.R. 26.  The Board denied remand, 
citing the binding precedent of then-Attorney General 
Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision, which held that, under the 
regulations governing the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review, IJs and the Board do not have the general authority to 
indefinitely suspend immigration proceedings by 
administrative closure.  The Board found that, since Arcos 
Sanchez did not show that his request for remand for 
administrative closure fell within the express exceptions under 
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Castro-Tum, his case could not be administratively closed.  27 
I. & N. Dec. at 283.2  Arcos-Sanchez petitioned for review of 
the Board’s decision.  
 
II. Jurisdiction 
   
 We have jurisdiction to review petitions under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a).  We review legal conclusions of the Board de novo, 
subject to established rules of deference.  Da Silva v. Att’y Gen. 
of the U.S., 948 F.3d 629, 633 (3d Cir. 2020).  Here, we are 
presented with the question whether then Attorney General 
Sessions’ Castro-Tum decision properly concluded that 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) unambiguously do 
not grant IJs and the Board the general authority to 
administratively close cases.  The Board denied  Arcos 
Sanchez’s remand request based on the Attorney General’s 
conclusion that there is no such general authority.  Arcos 
Sanchez challenges the Board’s reliance on that conclusion, 
which we will review de novo.  See Da Silva, 948 F.3d at 633. 
 
III. History of Administrative Closure 
 
A.    Pre Castro-Tum 
  
 Since at least the 1980s, IJs and the Board have utilized 
administrative closure as a docketing tool to remove cases from 
their active dockets as a matter of “administrative 
 
 2 As noted below, the Department of Justice amended 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) for removal 
proceedings initiated after January 15, 2021.  As this matter 




convenience.”  In re Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 479, 480 
(B.I.A. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652, 654 n.1 (B.I.A. 1988) 
(“The administrative closing of a case does not result in a final 
order,” but “is merely an administrative convenience which 
allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate 
situations.”).  Administrative closure allows an IJ or the Board 
to “temporarily pause removal proceedings” and place the case 
on hold because of a pending alternative resolution or because 
events outside the control of either party may affect the case.  
Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 18 (B.I.A. 2017). 
 
 Even though IJs and the Board have used general 
administrative closure for almost three decades, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) and the 
regulations governing IJs or the Board do not expressly 
authorize the practice.  See Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 
917-18 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the general power to 
administratively close a case is employed by quasi-judicial 
bodies for “orderly management of the docket” and is 
reviewable by courts).  Although the INA and its regulations 
do not specifically reference general administrative closure 
authority, the regulations both explicitly and implicitly confer 
broad powers on IJs and the Board to manage their dockets.  As 
regards IJs’ authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) concerns their 
“powers and duties” and states in relevant part: 
 
In conducting hearings under section 240 of the 
Act and such other proceedings the Attorney 
General may assign to them, immigration judges 
shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to 
them by the Act and by the Attorney General 
through regulation.  In deciding the individual 
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cases before them, and subject to the applicable 
governing standards, immigration judges shall 
exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion and may take any action consistent 
with their authorities under the Act and 
regulations that is appropriate and necessary for 
the disposition of such cases. ... In all cases, 
immigration judges shall seek to resolve the 
questions before them in a timely and impartial 
manner consistent with the Act and regulations. 
 
Id. (emphases added).  In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a)(iv) 
provides that IJs shall have the authority in any removal 
proceeding to “take any other action consistent with applicable 
law and regulations as may be appropriate.”  As regards the 
Board’s authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) states that Board 
members: 
 
shall exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion in considering and determining the 
cases coming before the Board, and a panel or 
Board member to whom a case is assigned may 
take any action consistent with their authorities 
under the Act and the regulations as is 
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of 
the case. 
 
Id. (emphases added). 
 
 Aside from regulations, Board decisions have also 
recognized the authority for IJs and the Board to 
administratively close cases, at first only if it was not “opposed 
by either of the parties.”  Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. 
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Dec. at 479.  In Matter of Avetisyan, the Board endorsed the 
administrative closure practice and held that both  8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) empower IJs and the Board 
to “take any action…as is appropriate and necessary for the 
disposition of [a] case.”  25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 691 (B.I.A. 
2012).  The Board applied a six-factor test to determine 
whether administrative closure was appropriate, regardless of 
government opposition.  See Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 696.  
It explained that, “[d]uring the course of proceedings, an [IJ] 
or the [Board] may find it necessary or, in the interests of 
justice and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further 
action for some period of time.”  Id.  The Board described two 
mechanisms to defer action: continuance and administrative 
closure.  “[A] continuance may be appropriately utilized to 
await additional action required of the parties that will be, or is 
expected to be, completed within a reasonably certain and brief 
amount of time.”  Id.  However, the Board observed in 
Avetisyan that when the parties must “await an action or event 
that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the 
control of the parties or the court and may not occur for a 
significant or undetermined period of time,” removing a case 
from the docket via administrative closure may be 
“appropriate.”  Id. at 692.   
 
 In addition, as described by the Board, administrative 
closure can facilitate “efficient management of the resources 
of the immigration courts and the Board.”  Id. at 695; see also 
Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir. 
2018) (citing Matter of Avetisyan as authority for 
administrative closure).  Under this framework, the Board has 
issued decisions recognizing the authority for IJs to 
administratively close cases for many reasons related to the 
interests of justice or to the conservation of court resources.  
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See e.g. Matter of Montiel, 26 I. & N. Dec. 555 (B.I.A. 2015) 
(holding administrative closure appropriate when a petitioner 
is awaiting resolution of a criminal conviction direct appeal).  
The Board reaffirmed Avetisyan in Matter of W-Y-U-, and 
clarified that “the primary consideration for an Immigration 
Judge in determining whether to administratively close or 
recalendar proceedings is whether the party opposing 
administrative closure has provided a persuasive reason for the 
case to proceed and be resolved on the merits.  27 I. & N. Dec. 
at 20. 
 
B.    Castro-Tum 
 
 On May 17, 2018, in Matter of Castro-Tum, then 
Attorney General Sessions employed administrative 
adjudication under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), holding that IJs 
and the Board lack the authority to administratively close cases 
“except where a previous regulation or settlement agreement 
has expressly conferred it.”  27 I. & N. Dec. at 283.  In that 
decision, the Attorney General overruled the contrary rulings 
from Avetisyan and W-Y-U-.  This decision reversed the 
decades-old practice of administrative closure, endorsed by 
Board decisions and rooted in prior interpretations of 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).  The Attorney General 
noted a sharp increase in administratively closed cases between 
2011 and 2017, which he linked to the more permissive 
standard established by Avetisyan.  Id. at 273.  And he observed 
that no statute or regulation explicitly grants IJs a general 
power of administrative closure.  In concluding that the 
regulations do not implicitly grant authority for administrative 
closure, he held that closure cannot be “appropriate and 
necessary” to the “disposition” of cases since closure is a 
suspension that delays the final resolution of a case.  Id. at 285.  
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He further reasoned that a general power to administratively 
close cases would conflict with the regulation’s requirement 
that IJs “timely” resolve their cases.  Id. 
 
C.    Post Castro-Tum  
 
 Since the issuance of Castro-Tum, our sister courts of 
appeals have split on whether it was correctly decided.  The 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits have ruled that the IJ and Board 
have general authority to administratively close cases.  In 
Romero v. Barr, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the regulations at 
issue and concluded that they “unambiguously confer upon IJs 
and the Board the general authority to administratively close 
cases[,]” but even if they are ambiguous, “the Attorney 
General’s reading of the regulations does not warrant 
deference because it amounts to an ‘unfair surprise.’”  937 F.3d 
282, 294-95 (4th Cir. 2019).  Similarly, in Meza Morales v. 
Barr, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Castro-Tum was 
contrary to the unambiguous meaning of the regulations and 
that IJs and the Board are “not precluded from administratively 
closing cases when appropriate.”  973 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 
2020) (Barrett, J.); see also Zelaya Diaz v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 687 
(7th Cir. 2021) (applying Meza-Morales).  Thus, two circuits 
have concluded that the regulations at issue unambiguously 
confer general authority for administrative closure and that 
Castro-Tum was wrongly decided.  On the other hand, in 
Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
regulations unambiguously do not authorize the general use of 
administrative closure and that Castro-Tum was correctly 
decided.  981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020).  That court held that 
§§ 1003.10 and 1003.1(d) do not delegate to IJs or the Board 
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“the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration 
proceedings by administrative closure.”3  Id. at 462. 
 
IV. Discussion  
 
 Arcos Sanchez argues that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) unambiguously grant IJs and the Board the 
general authority to administratively close cases by authorizing 
them to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” 
for the disposition of cases.  As such, Arcos Sanchez maintains 
that Castro-Tum was wrongly decided, and that the Board’s 
decision should be vacated and remanded so that he may seek 
administrative closure before the IJ.   His position reflects the 
rulings of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.   
 
 The government, on the other hand, argues that the 
Board was correct to apply Castro-Tum, because the 
unambiguous text of the regulations does not confer general 
authority for administrative closure.  This position tracks the 
ruling of the Sixth Circuit.  In the alternative, the government 
argues that, if we should find the regulations are ambiguous, 
then we should defer to Castro-Tum.  In either case, the 
government asks us to uphold the Board’s decision denying 
 
3 On December 16, 2020, the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review within the Department of Justice issued a 
final rule, endorsing the Sixth Circuit’s position on Castro-
Tum and codifying the Attorney General’s decision on 
administrative closure.  Appellate Procedures and Decisional 
Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 
85 Fed. Reg. 81588-01 (December 16, 2020).  This rule took 




Arcos Sanchez’s request for remand for administrative closure.  
We will now address the issue of the general authority of IJs 
and the Board to administratively close cases. 
 
 Our consideration of the regulations, and in turn Castro-
Tum, begins with review of the language of 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) to determine whether those 
regulations are ambiguous as regards any general authority for 
administrative closure.  “The basic tenets of statutory 
construction apply to construction of regulations.”  Pa. Fed’n 
of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 351 
(3d Cir. 2007).  “If a statute or rule is unambiguous, we must 
give effect to its plain meaning.”  Consol Pa. Coal Co., LLC v. 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 941 F.3d 95, 104 
(3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 
(2019)).  In Kisor, the Supreme Court admonished that “hard 
interpretive conundrums, even relating to complex rules, can 
often be solved” without “wav[ing] the ambiguity flag.”  139 
S. Ct. at 2415.  Indeed, a statute or rule cannot be “genuinely 
ambiguous” unless it remains unclear after we have 
“exhaust[ed] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”  Id.  
Consequently, our analysis proceeds by “‘carefully 
consider[ing]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose” of the 
statute or regulation.  Id. (citation omitted).  
 
In that regard, the Fourth Circuit in Romero applied the 
standard tools of interpretation by first reading the text of the 
relevant regulations.  Both regulations provide that IJs and the 
Board “may take any action ... appropriate and necessary for 
the disposition” of the case.  8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) & 
1003.10(b).  In assessing the word “any” for its plain meaning, 
Romero opined, “‘any action ... for the disposition of’ the case 
is read most naturally to encompass actions of whatever kind 
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appropriate for the resolution of a case.”  937 F.3d at 292 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).  The Fourth Circuit 
concluded,4 and we agree, “this would plainly include docket 
management actions such as administrative closure, which 
often facilitate…case resolution.”  Id.  Second, Romero 
observed, and we agree, that administrative closure qualifies as 
an “action” under §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).  In fact, 
the Castro-Tum decision describes administrative closure as an 
action.  27 I. & N. Dec. at 271.  Third, Romero noted the only 
limitation upon “any action” within the text of §§ 1003.10(b) 
and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) “is that the circumstances be ‘appropriate 
 
 4 Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019), 
bolstered its conclusion by comparing these regulations to the 
plain meaning afforded the word “any” in other statutes or 
regulations.  See, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 
214, 220 (2008) (concluding that “any…other law enforcement 
officer” means “law enforcement officers of whatever kind”); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007) (repetition of 
“any” embraced all airborne compounds); Brogan v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998) (“any” false statement 
included a false statement “of whatever kind”); United States 
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (concluding that the inclusion 
of the word “any” and the lack of restrictive language left no 
basis for limiting a provision in a sentencing statute); Harrison 
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (concluding 
Congress intended “any” as “expansive language”); Citizens’ 
Bank of La. v. Parker, 192 U.S. 73, 81, (1904) (“The word any 
excludes selection or distinction.  It declares the exemption 
without limitation.”); Int’l All. of Theatrical & Stage Emps. v. 
NLRB, 334 F.3d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that the use of 




and necessary’ for IJs and the [Board] to administratively close 
a case.”  937 F.3d at 293.  Specifically, this clause requires that 
any action taken must be appropriate and necessary for the 
disposition of each case consistent with authorities under the 
Act and regulations.  Precedent shows that the phrase 
“appropriate and necessary” is treated broadly.  Id. (citing 
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015) (“One does not 
need to open up a dictionary in order to realize the 
capaciousness of this phrase [‘appropriate and necessary’].”); 
see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 286 (2011) (noting 
“the word ‘appropriate’ is inherently context dependent”); 
Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1944) 
(concluding the word “necessary … has always been 
recognized as a word to be harmonized with its context”).  We 
similarly conclude that the use of the phrase “disposition of … 
case” relates to the context-driven phrase “appropriate and 
necessary.”  Board decisions have illustrated the many contexts 
in which administrative closure is “appropriate and 
necessary.”5  Thus, the limiting words “appropriate and 
 
 5 See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 
2012) (administrative closure granted pending visa petition on 
adjustment of status); Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 
135 n.10 (B.I.A. 2009)(administrative closure granted pending 
prima facie approvable of visa petition); Matter of Hashmi, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 785, 791 n.4 (administrative closure granted 
pending application for provisional waiver ); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (DHS regulation requiring individuals in 
removal proceedings to have the proceedings administratively 
closed prior to applying for a provisional waiver).  Nothing in 
§ 1003.10 or § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) suggests any limiting 




necessary” instruct that any action taken by the IJ or the Board 
must consider case-specific circumstances. 
 
 Finally, Romero noted, and we agree, that “the rest of 
the text of the relevant regulations supports the conclusion that 
IJs and the [Board] possess broad discretion in how to manage 
their cases.”  937 F.3d at 294.  As for IJs, § 1003.10(b) 
concludes, “[i]n all cases, immigration judges shall seek to 
resolve the questions before them in a timely and impartial 
manner consistent with the Act and regulations.”  As for the 
Board, § 1003.1(d)(1) likewise provides that “[t]he Board shall 
resolve the questions before it in a manner that is timely, 
impartial, and consistent with the Act and regulations.”  We 
agree with Romero that “administrative closure may—contrary 
to the Attorney General’s argument in Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. at 288–89—in fact facilitate the timely resolution of an 
issue or case.”  937 F.3d at 294.  Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit 
stated in Meza Morales, “not all mechanisms that lengthen the 
proceedings of a case prevent ‘timely’ resolution.”  Meza 
Morales, 973 F.3d at 665. 
 
 In an opinion by now-Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded in Meza Morales that “the 
immigration regulations that grant immigration judges their 
general powers [are] broad enough to implicitly encompass 
that [administrative closure] authority.”  Id.  Meza Morales 
cited the example given by the Fourth Circuit in Romero of 
when “appropriate and necessary actions” could include 
administrative closure: “cases in which two coordinate offices 
in the executive branch are simultaneously adjudicating 
collateral applications [and] closing one proceeding might help 
advance a case toward resolution.”  Id. (citing Romero, 937 
F.3d at 293).  And it rejected the Government’s arguments, 
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such as that other regulatory provisions would be rendered 
superfluous or that delays caused by administrative closure are 
forbidden by the regulations.  The opinion concludes that the 
regulatory preference for timeliness “is not a hard and fast 
deadline; some cases are more complex and simply take longer 
to resolve,” and therefore that preference “doesn’t justify 
departure from the plain text of the rule.”  Id. at 665.  In the 
end, “[e]xpeditiousness may be one … goal [of the 
regulations], but it is not the only goal.”  Id. at 666. 
 
            We are fully persuaded that, as discussed in Romero 
and Meza Morales, the regulations afford IJs and the Board 
authority to take any action (including administrative closure) 
as is appropriate and necessary (in the context of each case) 
for the disposition of such case to resolve questions in a timely 
and impartial manner consistent with the Act and regulations.  
After applying the standard tools of interpretation, by 
considering the text, structure, history, and purpose of 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), we hold that the plain 
language establishes that general administrative closure 
authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations. 
 
 Yet, the government argues that the very same 
regulations unambiguously do not confer general authority for 
administrative closure.6  In Castro-Tum, the Attorney General 
 
 6 Our dissenting colleague similarly contends that the 
regulations do not empower IJs or the BIA to administratively 
close cases.  The disagreement here, however, seems to be 
directed at how broadly those regulations were interpreted and 
applied prior to Castro-Tum, under the standard set out in 
Avetisyan, rather than at the correctness of Castro-Tum 
itself.  (See Dissent at 10 (“But those phrases, broad or not, are 
18 
 
said as much and noted that, “[a]lthough described as a 
temporary suspension” of removal proceedings, 
“administrative closure is effectively permanent in most 
instances.”  27 I. & N. Dec. at 272.  He reasoned that the 
regulations do not confer general administrative authority 
because such action effectively amounts to an indefinite 
suspension that delays or prevents the final disposition of a 
case and thus conflicts with regulations requiring IJs to timely 
resolve cases.  27 I. & N. at 285.  The Sixth Circuit majority in 
Hernandez-Serrano agreed with Castro-Tum and affirmed its 
conclusion that the regulations do not confer general authority 
for administrative closure. 
 
not best understood to render section 1003.10(b) without 
limitation and provide IJs nearly unfettered discretion.  To the 
contrary, ‘appropriate and necessary’ is itself an important 
restriction on the scope of the Attorney General’s delegation, 
and one that comes with some bite.”).)  To that end, the dissent 
criticizes our example of an immigration adjudication 
prevented by the shuttling of a file back and forth between 
USCIS and the Office of Chief Counsel, calling such evidence 
“too light a breeze to propel a vast delegation of general 
administrative closure authority.”  (Dissent at 15.)  But the 
question before us is not whether the regulations endow IJs and 
the BIA with a “vast delegation of general administrative 
closure authority.”  It is whether they entirely foreclose IJs or 
the BIA from ever exercising some degree of discretion to 
administratively close a case, as the Attorney General decided 
in Castro-Tum.  Thus, the dissent’s characterization of 
“administrative closure” as “the antithesis of a final 
disposition” does not convince us that Castro-Tum was 
correctly decided.  (Dissent at 7 (quoting Castro-Tum, 27 I. & 




 Both Castro-Tum and Hernandez-Serrano emphasize a 
concern that administrative closure leads to delay or no final 
decision in removal cases.  In fact, the opening sentence of the 
Hernandez-Serrano majority opinion states: “[a] regulation 
delegating to immigration judges authority to take certain 
actions ‘[i]n deciding the individual cases before them’ does 
not delegate to them general authority not to decide those cases 
at all.”  981 F.3d at 461.  That court also observed, “[t]hus the 
reality is that, in hundreds of thousands of cases, administrative 
closure has amounted to a decision not to apply the Nation's 
immigration laws at all.”  Id. at 463.  Concern about 
administrative closures causing widespread delay and non-
decision appears to have motivated both the Attorney 
General’s and the Sixth Circuit’s decisions.  If IJs are abusing 
their discretion, that may very well be cause for concern, but it 
does not relate to the question that Castro Tum purported to 
answer—whether the regulations confer general authority for 
administrative closure.  The majority in Herandez-Serrano 
even conceded that “the ‘timely manner’ language is 
hortatory,” but concluded that “the IJ can resolve neither 
questions nor a case once it is administratively closed.”  Id. 
 
 To this same point, the dissent observed, and we agree: 
 
whether immigration courts have granted 
administrative closure too frequently, and have 
failed to reopen administratively closed cases too 
often, is of no significance to the question of 
whether Castro-Tum wrongly held that IJs and 
the BIA never have the discretion to decide that 




necessary for the disposition” of immigration 
cases. 
 
981 F.3d at 471.  The authority to administratively close cases, 
within the appropriate and necessary context of each case, can 
and does permit IJs and the Board to answer the questions 
before them in a timely and impartial manner consistent with 
the Act and the regulations.  Or in other words, delay in the 
case through administrative closure does not, by definition, 
prevent the timely disposition of the case and resolution of 
questions. 
 
 As discussed above, certain removal cases require 
resolution of questions that depend upon decisions from other 
tribunals or agencies over which neither the IJ nor the Board 
controls.  The Attorney General’s Castro-Tum decision fails to 
acknowledge the fact that allowing time for the IJ or the Board 
to receive the outcome from another tribunal or agency enables 
resolution of relevant questions and thus facilitates the timely 
disposition of a removal case.  Without the general authority to 
administratively close appropriate cases when necessary, the 
IJs and the Board may not have a sufficiently developed record 
and may be less effective in managing cases.  Such a result is 
not contemplated by the Act or the regulations. 
 
       That some IJs and the Board may have used, or misused, 
administrative closure to unduly delay or permanently close 
and not decide cases does not answer the legal question of 
whether IJs or the Board have the general authority to 
administratively close cases under the regulations.  Improper 
use of administrative closure to attain objectives not authorized 
by the regulations is appropriately challenged and redressed 
through appropriate review, including judicial review under an 
21 
 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  See Vahora, 626 F.3d at 917 
(review of administrative closure under an abuse of discretion 
standard).  
 
 In addition, the INA grants the Attorney General 
rulemaking authority to set standards for immigration judges 
and the Board.  8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2).  Indeed, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.10(b) empowers IJs to exercise independent judgment 
and discretion in their decision making, “subject to the 
applicable governing standards” and other regulatory 
constraints.  Id.  As such, concern for undue delay or non-
decision in removal dispositions through the application of that 
discretion, to the extent not already addressed through the 
existing regulatory framework, can be redressed through 
agency rulemaking and standards.  “The Attorney General may 
amend these rules through the proper procedures.  But he may 
not, ‘under the guise of interpreting a regulation, ... create de 
facto a new regulation’ that contradicts the one in place.”  Meza 
Morales, 973 F.3d at 667 (citation omitted).  And, even if a 
regulation leads to bad policy, we “may not do the Attorney 
General’s work for him.”7  Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 
474 (Clay, J., dissenting).    
 
 7 The government submitted an argument in the 
alternative that, if the regulations were found to be ambiguous 
to the question of general administrative authority to 
administratively close immigration cases, then principles of 
agency deference should be afforded to apply the agency 
interpretation as presented in the Castro-Tum decision.  
However, this appeal is resolved by our finding that the 
regulations unambiguously grant general authority for IJs and 
the Board to administratively close immigration cases.  No 





 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the 
relevant regulations confer the general authority to 
administratively close cases to IJs and the Board.  We therefore 
grant the petition for review, vacate the Board’s order, and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
  MATEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
 For years, immigration judges (“IJs”) and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) have used administrative 
closure to pause removal proceedings and place immigration 
cases on indefinite hold. The Attorney General ended that 
practice in 2018. See generally Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).  
Abner Antonio Arcos Sanchez argues that the Attorney 
General is wrong. Longstanding regulations, he complains, 
authorize IJs and the BIA to take “any action” that is 
“appropriate and necessary.” But Arcos Sanchez reads only 
half the sentence. IJs, and the BIA, may take “any action . . . 
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of [their] cases.” 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (emphasis added); id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 
And the authority to “dispose” of immigration cases does not 
include permission to delay a decision forever. So I 
respectfully dissent. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE 
 I begin with the history informing the Attorney 
General’s decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, and agree with the 
majority that administrative closure is a “decades-old practice 
. . . endorsed by Board decisions and rooted in prior 
interpretations of [the governing regulations].” Maj. Op. at 10. 
But I read that history to show shallow foundations for 






A. Unclear Origins 
Modern administrative practices often have hazy 
heritages, and immigration administrative closure is no 
exception. Regulations dating to the 1950s granted “special 
inquiry officers,” the predecessors to IJs, and the BIA, the 
authority to act as “appropriate and necessary for the 
disposition of” their cases. 23 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2671 (Apr. 23, 
1958); 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9117 (Nov. 26, 1958). But while 
BIA opinions over the next two decades sometimes noted this 
language, see, e.g., Matter of Manneh, 16 I. & N. Dec. 272, 
272–73 (B.I.A. 1977), “there is little if any record of 
immigration cases being administratively closed,” Hernandez-
Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2020). Instead, by 
all accounts, immigration administrative closure arrived in a 
1984 memo from the Chief Immigration Judge advising IJs that 
they could order closure in in absentia cases.1 Perhaps 
foreshadowing this case, the memo cited no authority. 
 The BIA’s published administrative closure 
jurisprudence began soon after, and was similarly silent about 
 
1 See Memorandum to All Immigration Judges from 
William R. Robie, Chief Immigration Judge, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, Operating Policy and Procedure 84-
2: Cases in Which Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear for 
Hearing 1 (Mar. 7, 1984); see also Elizabeth Montano, The 
Rise and Fall of Administrative Closure in Immigration 
Courts, 129 Yale L.J. Forum 567, 570 (2020) (stating that 
“[t]he practice of administrative closure began in the 1980s 
based on a Department of Justice (DOJ) memorandum that 
listed administrative closure as an option available to 





any statutory or regulatory foundations. As the Attorney 
General later explained, the decisions “assumed without 
explanation that immigration judges and the Board possessed 
this general authority.” Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
at 275. In Matter of Amico, the BIA described administrative 
closure as simply “an administrative convenience.” 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 652, 654 n.1 (B.I.A. 1988). So too in Matter of Lopez-
Barrios, 20 I. & N. Dec. 203, 204 (B.I.A. 1990) and Matter of 
Munoz-Santos, 20 I. & N. Dec. 205, 207 (B.I.A. 1990). The 
BIA reaffirmed that view in 1996 in Matter of Gutierrez-
Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 479, 479 (B.I.A. 1996). Then, silence, 
and the BIA did not examine administrative closure again for 
over a decade. Elizabeth Montano, The Rise and Fall of 
Administrative Closure in Immigration Courts, 129 Yale L.J. 
Forum 567, 571 (2020). “Thus, by all appearances, 
administrative closure was simply a device created by the IJs 
themselves[.]” Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 464 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
B. Circumscribed Regulatory Adoption 
 That conclusion matches the evolution of the regulatory 
guidance. Until the late 1990s, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
regulations did not mention administrative closure. Matter of 
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 276. In 1998, the Attorney 
General formally acknowledged the growing practice, 
promulgating regulations narrowly allowing administrative 
closure in specific circumstances. For example, 8 C.F.R. § 
1245.13(d)(3)(i) mandated administrative closure in removal 
proceedings involving certain Nicaraguan or Cuban nationals. 
Other targeted rules followed between 1999 and 2003. See, 
e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.62(b)(1)–(2), 1240.70(f)–(h) 
(implementing a settlement agreement establishing 




Salvadoran nationals); id. § 1245.15(p)(4)(i) (mandating 
administrative closure for specified Haitian nationals); id. § 
1245.21(c) (permitting certain nationals of Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos to move for administrative closure 
pending their applications for adjustment of status).  
 None, however, provided for administrative closure 
generally. So where did the IJ and BIA get the authority to 
close cases in all these other proceedings? 
C. Matter of Avetisyan and Expansion 
 In 2012—almost three decades into this regime—the 
BIA offered its first answer. The trio of 1990s-era 
proceedings—Matter of Munoz-Santos, Matter of Lopez-
Barrios, and Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez—all permitted 
administrative closure as a matter of “administrative 
convenience,” but only when both parties supported the 
request. See, e.g., Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
at 480. Since the government typically opposed, this rule 
operated as a sort of veto power over closure requests. 
Troubled, the BIA in Matter of Avetisyan changed course, 
replacing the consensus requirement with a multifactor 
analysis. 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 694–96 (B.I.A. 2012). And, 
importantly, it rested this authority on two regulations that, it 
suggested, confer broad authority to the IJs and BIA to manage 
their dockets: 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(1). See id. at 691 (citing both).  
 The first, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b), concerns the “powers 
and duties” of IJs, and states in relevant part: 
In deciding the individual cases before them, and 




immigration judges shall exercise their 
independent judgment and discretion and may 
take any action consistent with their authorities 
under the Act and regulations that is appropriate 
and necessary for the disposition of such cases. . 
. . In all cases, immigration judges shall seek to 
resolve the questions before them in a timely and 
impartial manner consistent with the Act and 
regulations. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The second, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), which governs 
the powers of the BIA, allows “any action consistent with their 
authorities under the Act and the regulations as is appropriate 
and necessary for the disposition of the case.” Id.  
 Neither regulation, though, provides for “administrative 
closure” anywhere in its text. No matter, the BIA concluded: 
“During the course of proceedings, an Immigration Judge or 
the Board may find it necessary or, in the interests of justice 
and fairness to the parties, prudent to defer further action for 
some period of time.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
691. One option available to an IJ, the BIA acknowledged, “is 
a continuance.” Id. As it so happens, continuances, unlike 
administrative closures, are expressly permitted “[p]ursuant to 
regulation.” Id. at 691–92; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Even so, the 
BIA believed administrative closure could better facilitate 
“efficient[] management of the resources” of the immigration 
courts and the BIA. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 
695. A similar conclusion followed in Matter of W-Y-U-. 27 I. 




 These decisions had immediate, practical effect: 
Administrative closures soared. Statistics maintained by the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review show that from 1980 
to 2011, 283,366 cases were administratively closed (about 
9,100 per year)—“[b]ut in a mere six years, from October 1, 
2011 through September 30, 2017, immigration judges and the 
Board ordered administrative closure in 215,285 additional 
cases,” or more than 35,000 per year. Matter of Castro-Tum, 
27 I. & N. Dec. at 273; see also Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 
289 (4th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging that “as of October 2018, 
over 330,000 cases remained administratively closed”). 
D.  The Attorney General Intervenes 
 Eventually, the Attorney General stepped in. In 2014, 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced 
removal proceedings against Reynaldo Castro-Tum. Matter of 
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 279. The IJ sent five separate 
hearing notices summoning Castro-Tum to appear. Id. at 280. 
Each time, Castro-Tum did not. Id. DHS asked the IJ to 
proceed in absentia, but the IJ refused and instead, 
administratively closed the case (along with ten others) over its 
objection. Id. The government appealed, the BIA vacated the 
IJ’s decision, and the Attorney General assumed responsibility 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). Id. at 280–81. 
 After reviewing the submissions,2 regulations, history, 
and practice of administrative closure, the Attorney General 
 
2 The Attorney General requested briefing from the 
parties and any interested amici on the scope of the IJ’s, and 
BIA’s, authority to order administrative closure. Matter of 
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 281. DHS and fourteen amici 




concluded that “immigration judges and the Board lack a 
general authority to grant administrative closure.” Id. at 282. 
In so doing, the Attorney General overruled the BIA’s contrary 
decisions in Matter of Avetisyan and Matter of W-Y-U-. Id. at 
271. The parties and amici, the Attorney General observed, 
“agree that no statute or regulation explicitly delegates general 
administrative-closure authority.” Id. at 284. But some amici, 
and the BIA in Matter of Avetisyan, inferred a delegation from 
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). Id. As the 
Attorney General explained, however, those regulations only 
grant IJs and the BIA the authority to take measures 
“appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of the cases. 
“Administrative closure,” in contrast, was “the antithesis of a 
final disposition.” Id. at 285. That made administrative closure 
permissible only when a regulation or judicially approved 
settlement agreement provides authorization. Id. at 271; see 
also id. at 272.3  
 
3 Since Matter of Castro-Tum, the courts of appeals 
have split on the propriety of the Attorney General’s 
interpretation. Compare Romero, 937 F.3d at 292 (“[T]he plain 
language of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) 
unambiguously confers upon IJs and the BIA the general 
authority to administratively close cases . . . .”), with Meza 
Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 2020) (stating that 
“Castro-Tum’s interpretive arguments fail to convince us that 
administrative closure is not plainly within an immigration 
judge’s authority to take ‘any action’ that is ‘appropriate and 
necessary for the disposition of . . . cases’” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.10(b))), and Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 464 
(“respectfully disagree[ing] . . . with the Fourth Circuit’s 




II.  DISCUSSION 
 Against this backdrop, Arcos Sanchez asks for 
administrative closure to renew his application under the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. The BIA 
found that his claim was “squarely controlled by Matter of 
Castro-Tum.” (A.R. at 4.) Arcos Sanchez and the majority 
respond that Matter of Castro-Tum should not control at all, 
because the Attorney General’s reading of the pertinent federal 
regulations—namely 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii)—is incorrect.  
 I agree with the majority that when interpretation 
becomes challenging, we do not “throw up our hands and let 
regulatory agencies do it for us.” Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (stating that “a 
court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the 
regulation impenetrable on first read”). But respectfully, after 
exhausting “all the traditional tools of construction,” I do not 
agree that the majority’s interpretation supplies the best 
ordinary understanding of these regulations. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted); Jaroslawicz v. 
M&T Bank Corp., 962 F.3d 701, 710–11 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A]s 
with statutory interpretation, our review of a regulation centers 
on the ordinary meaning of the text.”). 
A. Reading 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1) 
 IJs exercise only “the powers and duties delegated to 
them by the [Immigration and Nationality] Act and by the 
 





Attorney General through regulation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). 
So too with members of the BIA, who “act as the Attorney 
General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.” Id. § 
1003.1(a)(1). None argue that a statute or regulation explicitly 
grants IJs, or the BIA, a general power of administrative 
closure. See, e.g., Maj. Op. at 7 (stating that “the INA and its 
regulations do not specifically reference general administrative 
closure authority”); Meza Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 665 
(7th Cir. 2020) (acknowledging that “no statute or regulation 
explicitly confers upon immigration judges a general power of 
administrative closure”). So the question is whether one does 
so impliedly.  
 Like the BIA in Matter of Avetisyan—which Matter of 
Castro-Tum overruled—the majority points to 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1). Section 1003.10(b) provides in 
relevant part: “In deciding the individual cases before them, 
and subject to the applicable governing standards, immigration 
judges shall exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion and may take any action consistent with their 
authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and 
necessary for the disposition of such cases.”4  
 Focusing on the phrases “any action” and “appropriate 
and necessary,” the majority concludes that section 1003.10(b) 
“include[s] . . . actions such as administrative closure, which 
often facilitate . . . case resolution.” Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting 
Romero, 937 F.3d at 292). That is because, the majority notes, 
“[i]n case after case, [courts] have given effect to th[e] 
expansive sense of ‘any.’” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 
139 S. Ct. 1743, 1756 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting). So too, it 
 
4 As explained earlier, the delegation to the BIA, at 




argues, with the phrase “appropriate and necessary,” which is 
a “broad and all-encompassing term,” White Stallion Energy 
Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 Fair enough. But those phrases, broad or not, are not 
best understood to render section 1003.10(b) without limitation 
and provide IJs nearly unfettered discretion. To the contrary, 
“appropriate and necessary” is itself an important restriction on 
the scope of the Attorney General’s delegation, and one that 
comes with some bite. A point made in the same paragraph of 
the same opinion the majority cites. See Maj. Op. at 15 (citing 
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 752 (2015)). As the Michigan 
Court explained, “[a]lthough th[e] term [“appropriate”] leaves 
agencies with flexibility,” its discretion is not unlimited: “[A]n 
agency may not ‘entirely fai[l] to consider an important aspect 
of the problem’” its regulations task it with solving. 576 U.S. 
at 752 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
“Appropriate and necessary” is thus “not a mere formality, but 
. . . a plainly expressed limitation.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 
379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964).  
 Nor is it true that “[n]othing in §§ 1003.10 or 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii) suggests any limiting parameters on what may 
be considered ‘appropriate and necessary.’” Maj. Op. at 15 n.5. 
Section 1003.10(b), after all, does not permit IJs to take “any 
action” so long as it is “appropriate and necessary.” Rather, IJs 
may take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary for 
the disposition of” “the individual cases before them.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.10(b) (emphasis added). This restriction is no mere 
gloss: “It is . . . a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 




(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)); see 
also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 148 (2012). 
And there is meaning to this “disposition” requirement. 
The Attorney General’s regulations do not define 
“disposition,” but that is the usual occasion to reach for our 
“toolkit” containing “all the standard tools of interpretation” 
used to “carefully consider the text, structure, history, and 
purpose” of the regulation. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–15 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). That allows 
us to “‘reach a conclusion about the best interpretation,’ 
thereby resolving any perceived ambiguity.” Shular v. United 
States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 788 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
in the judgment)). 
And the ordinary meaning of “disposition” is that of “[a] 
final settlement or determination.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
505 (8th ed. 2004); see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 361 (11th ed. 2005) (“final arrangement”); The 
American Heritage Dictionary 522 (4th ed. 2009) (“[a] final 
settlement”).5 Section 1003.10(b) is thus best understood to 
 
5 See also Daniel J. Oran, Oran’s Dictionary of the Law 
134 (1983) (defining a “disposition” as a final “settlement or 
result”); William C. Burton, Burton’s Legal Thesaurus 187 (3d 
ed. 1998) (including as synonyms “conclusion, decision, . . . 
final settlement of a matter, finding, order, pronouncement, . . 
. resolution, settlement, [and] solution”); Black’s Law 
Dictionary 484 (7th ed. 1999) (“[a] final settlement or 
determination”). The predecessor regulations read no 




limit IJs to actions that are “appropriate and necessary” for the 
final resolution of the cases before them—not for actions 
merely facilitating the “efficient management of the resources 
of the immigration courts and the BIA.” Romero, 937 F.3d at 
289 (cleaned up). That follows the construction given the term 
by various courts in many contexts over several decades.6 As 
the D.C. Circuit once put it: “After hearing argument, judges 
frequently tell the parties that they will advise them of the 
disposition of the matter. We expect that litigants, including 
the parties to this appeal, would be both surprised and puzzled 
if all we told them at the end of the day was that ‘the case has 
been decided’—without telling them what that decision was.” 
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. HHS, 332 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 To be sure, we do not “construe the meaning of 
statutory terms in a vacuum,” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 
(2001), but interpret the words of a statute or regulation “in 
 
Dictionary of the English Language 752 (1955) (defining “to 
dispose” as “to arrange or settle matters finally”). 
6 See, e.g., Lexon Ins. Co. v. Naser, 781 F.3d 335, 338 
(6th Cir. 2015) (“A disposition is ‘a final settlement or 
determination.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 572 (10th 
ed. 2014))); United States v. Jarrell, 147 F.3d 315, 317 n.2 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (writing that “[a] ‘disposition’ is ‘[t]he final 
settlement of a matter’” and it “does not encompass the 
ongoing effects of a ruling by the court” (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 326 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991))); Ruggieri v. Warner 
& Swasey Co., 938 F.2d 322, 324 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The term 
‘disposition’ connotes ‘finality[.]’”); Campbell Indus., Inc. v. 
Offshore Logistics Int’l, Inc., 816 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 
1987) (stating that to “dispose of” a motion, a court must act in 




their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme,” Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 
803, 809 (1989). So we “extend[] our gaze from the narrow 
[regulatory] provision at issue to take in the larger [regulatory] 
landscape.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. 
Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017). That scheme confirms the ordinary 
understanding of “disposition” because sections 1003.10(b) 
and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) delegate authority to take only actions that 
further the actual resolution of cases. After recognizing that IJs 
may take “appropriate and necessary” actions, for example, 
section 1003.10(b) concludes by directing IJs to “resolve the 
questions before them in a timely and impartial manner 
consistent with the [INA] and regulations.” (emphases added). 
Section 1003.1(d)(1) provides the same. And 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.12 advises that the governing regulations are to “assist in 
the expeditious, fair, and proper resolution of matters.” 
(emphases added). 
B. Administrative Closures Are Not “Dispositions”  
of Cases 
 All this persuades me that section 1003.10(b) does not 
give IJs the authority to delay, perhaps forever, in deciding a 
case. For, as the majority agrees, “administrative closure” does 
not lead to resolution. See Maj. Op. at 7 (“‘The administrative 
closing of a case does not result in a final order,’ but ‘is merely 
an administrative convenience which allows the removal of 
cases from the calendar in appropriate situations.’” (quoting 
Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 654 n.1)). It is, rather, “the 
antithesis of [it].” Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 
285.  
The mechanics of administrative closure itself make this 




. . from an Immigration Judge’s active calendar.” Matter of 
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 692. The BIA has described this 
as “temporar[y].” Id. That seems overly optimistic: “Unless a 
party ‘move[s] to recalendar [an administratively closed case] 
before the Immigration Court . . . or to reinstate the appeal 
before the Board,’ the case remains indefinitely suspended 
without a final resolution.” Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. at 272–73 (quoting Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
at 692). The case disappears from the docket, the IJ no longer 
tracks it, and “the alien respondent in most cases has few 
incentives to seek to recalendar because ‘as a general matter, 
every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who 
wishes merely to remain in the United States.’” Id. at 273 
(quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)). 
But we need not speculate. Since 1980, less than a third 
of cases administratively closed have even returned to the 
calendar. Id. Far from “disposing” of cases, administrative 
closure usually leads to no resolution at all. No doubt that is 
more “administrative[ly] convenien[t]” for the IJ and BIA. 
Maj. Op. at 6–7 (quoting Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. at 480). But it is not an action encompassed within the 
Attorney General’s delegation of authority in sections 
1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). 
C. Nor Are Administrative Closures “Appropriate and 
Necessary” For Their Disposition 
Arcos Sanchez and the majority take a different tack, 
reasoning that even if administrative closure does not itself 
“dispos[e]” of a case, it may be “appropriate and necessary” 
because it leads to the matter’s “disposition.” Respectfully, I 




Arcos Sanchez points to the facts of Matter of 
Avetisyan, which he argues prove how, counterintuitively, 
administrative closure can “expedite . . . a final disposition” of 
his, and others’, cases. (Opening Br. at 18 (quoting Romero, 
937 F.3d at 294 n.13).)7 As he describes it, in Matter of 
Avetisyan, despite several continuances, the petitioner’s 
“immigration file [was] shuttled back and forth between 
USCIS and the Office of Chief Counsel, which in turn 
prevented USCIS from completing its adjudication of her visa 
petition.” (Opening Br. at 19.) Frustrated, the IJ 
administratively closed the petitioner’s proceedings; this 
“provid[ed] USCIS an uninterrupted period to adjudicate the 
petition.” (Opening Br. at 19.) Powerful evidence, it seems, 
that DHS should improve its intra-agency communications, 
perhaps at the direction of Congress. But too light a breeze to 
propel a vast delegation of general administrative closure 
authority. 
The majority, in turn, maintains that administrative 
closure may be “appropriate and necessary” to halt removal 
proceedings while awaiting a decision from another 
adjudicatory body. As the majority puts it, “certain removal 
cases require resolution of questions that depend upon 
decisions from other tribunals or agencies over which neither 
the IJ nor the Board controls.” Maj. Op. at 20. So, “[w]ithout 
the general authority to administratively close appropriate 
cases when necessary,” it complains, “the IJs and the Board 
 
7 The majority agrees. See Maj. Op. at 16 (“We agree 
with Romero that ‘administrative closure may—contrary to the 
Attorney General’s argument in Castro-Tum—in fact facilitate 




may not have a sufficiently developed record and may be less 
effective in managing cases.” Maj. Op. at 20.  
This concern does not escape me; it would be “absurd 
indeed that [a petitioner] should be ordered removed because,” 
for example, “the file needed for one DHS office to adjudicate 
his [or her] I-130 petition was being held by a different DHS 
office, which succeeded in removing [the petitioner] because 
the first DHS office had failed to adjudicate the petition.” 
Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2008). But 
thankfully, that is not the situation we, or Arcos Sanchez, face. 
Far from “fail[ing] to acknowledge the fact that allowing time 
for the IJ or the Board to receive the outcome from another 
tribunal or agency enables resolution of relevant questions,” 
Maj. Op. at 20, the Attorney General has already given IJs a 
tool for managing these exact circumstances—where, “in the 
interests of justice and fairness to the parties, [it may be] 
prudent to defer further action for some period of time,” Matter 
of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 691. That tool, of course, is a 
continuance, and IJs may grant them “for good cause shown.” 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.29.8 They are broadly available for petitioners 
seeking to pause removal proceedings to allow for resolution 
of other collateral ones that may bear on removability. See, 
e.g., Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 807 (B.I.A. 2012) 
(U visas); Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127 (B.I.A. 2009) 
(employment-based visas); Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
785 (B.I.A. 2009) (family-based visas). The Attorney General 
 
8 Where appropriate, an IJ may also adjourn the 
proceedings: “After the commencement of the hearing, the 
immigration judge may grant a reasonable adjournment either 
at his or her own instance or, for good cause shown, upon 




recently reaffirmed as much. Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 405, 419 (A.G. 2018).9 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Presumably, the scope of our decision today is limited. 
As the majority notes, DOJ issued a final rule largely resolving 
this interpretive dispute. Perhaps the arguments offered by 
Arcos Sanchez deserve closer attention by those charged with 
writing the law. But whatever the wisdom or folly of Matter of 
Castro-Tum as a matter of immigration policy, it is correct as 
a matter of interpretation. Administrative closure is a device 
only “created for the convenience of the Immigration Courts 
and the Board.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 690. 
As it finds no footing in section 1003.10(b) and section 
1003.1(d)(1)(ii), I respectfully dissent. 
 
9 Arcos Sanchez objects that continuances provide for 
only a “brief pause,” “where the reason for the delay will be 
resolved quickly,” while administrative closure “removes 
cases from an IJ’s active docket until they are recalendared.” 
(Reply Br. at 20.) Continuances, he complains, unlike 
administrative closure, thus “keep[] the case on the IJ’s active 
calendar and require[] the parties to regularly report to the court 
after each short continued period, regardless of whether the 
collateral relief is resolved.” (Reply Br. at 20 (citation 
omitted).) All true, and a good reason to favor the 
accountability provided by continuances. 
